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INTRODUCTION
On September 29, 2015, Governor of the Bank of England Mark Carney 
delivered a major policy address to UK insurers gathered for a black-tie event at 
Lloyds of London in the City of London. Entitled “Breaking the Tragedy of the 
Horizon,” Mr. Carney’s after-dinner talk eschewed the usual conventions of humor 
and reasonably light fare to discuss the challenges facing the world from climate 
change.1 While recognizing global risks to property, political stability and food and 
water security from climate change, the speech concentrated on three categories of 
* Cynthia Williams is Osler Chair in Business Law, Osgoode Hall Law School. 
1.  Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of England, Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon: Climate Change 
and Financial Stability, Address at Lloyd’s of London City Dinner (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www 
.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2015/speech844.pdf. Mr. Carney entitles 
the risks from climate change a “tragedy of the horizon” since the most serious consequences of today’s 
emissions will eventuate beyond the time-frame of today’s business cycles, political cycles and regulatory 
cycles, which are at maximum ten years. 
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financial stability risks: those caused by the physical changes induced by climate 
change; liability risks if “extractors and emitters” and/or their officers and directors 
were to be held liable for the negative effects of their products; and financial risks 
from the transition to a low-carbon economy. This latter category includes the risk 
of the value of “stranded [oil, gas and coal] assets” on the balance sheets of banks, 
insurance companies and pension funds being rapidly re-priced downward; and the 
potential that “an abrupt resolution of the tragedy of the horizons is itself a financial 
stability risk.”2
Having laid out an imposing scenario, Mr. Carney then suggested that better 
information would help “the market itself to adjust efficiently,” in a situation where 
multiple parameters will “influence the speed of transition to a low-carbon 
economy,” including public policy, technology, investor preferences and physical 
events.3 One approach Mr. Carney said the Financial Stability Board (FSB) was 
considering was to ask the G20 “to establish an industry-led group, a Climate 
Disclosure Task Force, to design and deliver a voluntary standard for disclosure by 
those companies that produce or emit carbon.”4 By having access to information 
about the carbon intensity of goods and services, investors can then “assess risks to 
companies’ business models and . . . express their views in the market.”5 This 
information can also inform policy makers, who could “learn from markets’ 
reactions and refine their stance, with better information allowing more informed 
reactions, and supporting better policy decisions including on targets and 
instruments.”6
Mr. Carney recognized that information on carbon emissions is not lacking in 
the market: indeed, he stated that there are “nearly 400 initiatives”7 that suggest or 
require the disclosure of companies’ greenhouse gas emissions or environmental 
data. Still, with more consistent, comparable, reliable, clear and efficient information 
about companies’ current emissions and the strategies companies plan to employ in 
their transition to the “net-zero world of the future,”8 he asserted that both markets 
and government would have better tools to manage the transition to a low-carbon 
economy. The efficacy of these tools could be amplified by government “giving 
guidance on possible carbon price paths,” a so-called “price corridor,” plus stress 
testing to determine “the skews from climate change to the returns of various 
businesses.”9 But generally Mr. Carney has faith that by “managing what gets 
measured, we can break the Tragedy of the Horizon.”10
2.  Id. at 11. 
3.  Id. at 11, 12. 
4.  Id. at 14. 
5.  Id. at 12. 
6.  Id. at 13. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Id. at 14. 
9.  Id. at 15. 
10. Id. at 16. 
2016] The Global Reporting Initiative 69 
In his view of markets being able to adapt and lead the transition to a low-
carbon future if given appropriate information, albeit recognizing the importance 
of a supportive policy environment and with technological advances, Mr. Carney 
unwittingly joins social responsibility activists and socially responsible investors who 
for at least two decades have promoted disclosure and transparency as important 
levers for changing corporate behavior. Transnational, voluntary disclosure regimes 
for producing expanded environmental, social and governance (ESG) information, 
such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) or the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP), have proliferated, as have some government requirements for such 
disclosure, as discussed below. Yet these developments occur as automated trading 
replaces the kind of contextual, information-based trading that ESG disclosure 
might affect for a significant percentage of trades in the market;11 and as global 
emissions continue to rise, notwithstanding voluntary greenhouse gas (GHG) 
disclosure by five-thousand of the world’s largest operating companies using the 
CDP framework.12 Thus, how powerful a mechanism voluntary disclosure is or can 
be for producing operational changes within companies, and how effective self-
regulatory or multi-stakeholder corporate responsibility initiatives generally can be 
are both questions that bear further exploration. Given how ubiquitous disclosure 
and self-regulation have become in the transnational business context, this essay will 
start that exploration, while recognizing that each question deserves more 
substantial treatment than will be attempted here. 
In this essay, the Author provides an overview in Part I of some initiatives to 
require or encourage companies to produce specific ESG data, authored both by 
governments and by private standard-setters. In Part II, one disclosure initiative in 
11.  Estimates of the percentage of trades that are computer generated vary between 39% 
(Europe) and 51% (U.S.) in one report, WORLD FED’N OF EXCHS., UNDERSTANDING HIGH
FREQUENCY TRADING (2012), http://www.world-exchanges.org/home/index.php/files/23/Position 
%20Papers%20%20Educational%20Materials/71/Understanding%20High%20Frequency%20Tradin
g%20(HFT).pdf, but other estimates suggest between 50% and 70% of all equities trades by volume 
are computer generated. See Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading and Market Structure, UCLA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016) (citing STAFF OF THE DIV. OF TRADING AND MKTS., U.S. SECS. AND EXCH.
COMM’N, EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW: PART II: HIGH FREQUENCY 
TRADING, 4-7 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/hft_lit_review_march_2014 
.pdf). Regulators generally agree there are no good data on the phenomenon. Of course, automated 
trading relies upon information, but this is primarily financial information and trading trends, and not 
the expanded qualitative and quantitative ESG data that corporate accountability advocates promote or 
that GRI produces.
12.  See, e.g., JOHN MOORHEAD & TIM NIXON, GLOBAL 500 GREENHOUSE GASES
PERFORMANCE 2010-2013: 2014 REPORT ON TRENDS, 3 (Thomson Reuters, 2014) (finding that 
greenhouse gas emissions by the top 500 global companies rose 3.1% from 2010 through 2013, whereas 
they should have decreased by 4.2% during that same period for the world to have a likely probability 
of staying under a 2 degree Celsius rise in global average temperatures). The key question to investigate 
is whether emissions have stabilized or gone down/per unit of revenue, for the 5,000 firms producing 
information to CDP. The variety in formats for CDP disclosure makes answering that question difficult. 
See Ans Kolk, David Levy & Jonatan Pinkse, Corporate Responses in an Emerging Climate Regime: The 
Institutionalization and Commensuration of Carbon Disclosure. 17(4) EUR. ACCT. REV. 719, 721 (2008)
(concluding that voluntary carbon disclosure to CDP “remains inconsistent and difficult to interpret.”). 
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particular will be discussed as an example of a transnational legal order (TLO), as 
defined by Professors Shaffer and Halliday,13 and that is the Global Reporting 
Initiative, which has become the benchmark corporate social disclosure framework. 
Part III identifies a number of significant questions about our knowledge of the real 
power of information strategies to change corporate behavior, as the GRI seeks to 
do, as well as questions about the efficacy of self-regulation generally. 
Part IV then asserts that the “legality” aspect is a centrally-important element 
of the TLO framework advanced by Shaffer and Halliday. Particularly regarding 
transnational corporate responsibility, reliance has been placed almost exclusively 
on “new governance” initiatives, which are generally non-binding, voluntary, 
collaboratively developed standards for responsible behavior. New governance 
standards have fascinated academics from a wide range of fields, including this 
author, leading to an explosion of literature on the cognate topics over the last ten 
to fifteen years.14 Yet, during this same period of time, Bi-lateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs) and free-trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), have been negotiated throughout the world. These treaties 
generally permit private companies to challenge any government action—legislative, 
regulatory, or judicial—that is alleged to reduce the company’s future profits.15
These challenges are heard by private arbitrators and are not subject to judicial 
review.
The contrast is stark between new governance forms of collaborative, often 
industry-led, voluntary standards for responsible action, and the limits on sovereign 
regulatory authority being developed as a result of the expansion of the investor-
state system for arbitration pursuant to BITs and trade agreements, leading this 
author to remember the line in the movie the Wizard of Oz: “pay no attention to the 
man behind the curtain.” To badly mix literary references, we may have fixed our 
collective attention on the construction of a transnational regulatory Potemkin 
village even as the man behind the curtain progressively undermines the capacity of 
the strong form of regulation, that of sovereign domestic law. It is in emphasizing 
the importance of legality and how transnational norms “touch down” in binding 
processes, court proceedings, contracts, or public proceedings that Shaffer and 
Halliday’s theory of Transnational Legal Orders reorients our thinking in a 
productive, and important, direction.16 Part V concludes. 
13.  TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, eds., 
Cambridge University Press 2015). 
14.  See Part IV, footnotes 73 to 95, 101 to 111 for some of the standard references introducing 
this literature. 
15.  See GUS VAN HARTEN, SOVEREIGN CHOICES AND SOVEREIGN CONSTRAINTS (Oxford
University Press 2013) for a thorough discussion of this problem [hereinafter VAN HARTEN,
SOVEREIGN CHOICES]. For a short introduction showing the expansion of investor-state arbitrations 
since the 1990s see Gus Van Harten, Private Authority and Transnational Governance: The Contours of the 
International System of Investor Protection, 12:4 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 600 (2005) [hereinafter Van Harten, 
Private Authority].
16.  TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 13. 
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I. TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE REPORTING17
A. Voluntary ESG Reporting 
Over the past two decades, corporate sustainability reporting has developed 
from an academic idea in critical accounting to a global business practice.18 While 
some jurisdictions are starting to require ESG reporting (as described below), much 
of this reporting is still voluntary. 
The most comprehensive source of data on ESG reporting is that done by 
KPMG in the Netherlands. KPMG published its first ESG report in 1993, and its 
most recent in 2013. In 1993, twelve percent of the top 100 companies in the 
OECD countries (ex. Japan) published an environmental or social report.19 By 2013, 
seventy-six percent of the top 100 companies in the Americas publish a separate 
corporate responsibility report, as do seventy-three percent of top 100 companies 
in Europe and seventy-one percent in Asia.20 Of the largest 250 companies globally, 
reporting rates are ninety-three percent.21
The Global Reporting Initiative’s voluntary, multi-stakeholder framework for 
ESG reporting has emerged as the clear global benchmark: seventy-eight percent of 
reporting companies worldwide and eighty-two percent of the Global 250 use GRI 
as the basis for their corporate responsibility reporting.22 GRI’s development as a 
Transnational Legal Order (TLO) will be discussed in more detail below. Slightly 
over half (fifty-nine percent) of the Global 250 now have their reports “assured,” 
most often (two-thirds of the time) by the specialist bureaus of the major 
accountancy firms.23
In addition to the quantity of corporate responsibility reporting, KPMG also 
evaluates the quality of reporting. Here, European companies generally do 
substantially better than those in Asia or the Americas (average quality scores of 
seventy-one out of 100 in Europe versus fifty-four for companies in the Americas 
17.  Section I of this Article is based on portions of Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Corporate Governance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Georg Ringe, eds.  Forthcoming March 2017). 
18.  For an excellent overview of the evolution of corporate responsibility as an academic theory 
in the management literature, see Archie B. Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional 
Construct, 38 BUS. & SOC’Y 268 (1999). 
19.  See Ans Kolk, A Decade of Sustainability Reporting: Developments and Significance, 3 INT’L J. ENV’T
& SUSTAINABLE DEV. 51, 52 fig.1 (2004). KPMG has changed the format of the report since its original 
1993 report on corporate responsibility reporting, so direct comparisons are not possible between the 
Global 250 in 1993 and the Global 250 in 2013. 
20.  KPMG, The KPMG Survey of CR Reporting 2013, at 10, https://www.kpmg.com/Global/en 
/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/corporate-responsibility/Documents/corporate- 
responsibility-reporting-survey-2013-exec-summary.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2015). 
21.  See id. 
22.  See id. at 11. The GRI is now in its fourth iteration. It has been developed by, and is used 
by, thousands of companies, governments, and non-profit entities around the world to report on the 
economic, environmental, and social and governance effects of entities’ actions. See Global Reporting 
Initiative, http://www.globalreporting.org.
23.  See KPMG, supra note 20, at 11. 
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and fifty  in Asia Pacific).24 Within the Global 250, companies are starting to see 
more opportunities than risks from social and environmental factors, such as for 
the development of new products and services. Eighty-seven percent of the Global 
250 identify climate change, material resource scarcity and trends in energy and fuel 
as “megatrends” that will affect their business.25 Ultimately KPMG concludes that 
“[m]any companies no longer see corporate responsibility as a moral issue, but as 
core business risks and opportunities.”26
B. Required Sustainability Reporting 
By 2015, many European countries or their stock exchanges, and the EU itself, 
require some environmental or social disclosure, to varying degrees of specificity.27
The EU’s requirement is a directive that entered into force on the sixth of 
December 2014; member states will need to transpose it into national legislation 
within two years.28 It will require approximately 6,000 large companies and “public 
interest organizations,” such as banks and insurance companies, to “prepare a non-
financial statement containing information relating to at least environmental 
matters, social and employee-related matters, respect for human rights, anti-
corruption and bribery matters.”29 This requirement builds upon EU accounting 
rules (the EU Accounts Modernization Directive) that have, since 2003, required 
companies to report on environmental and labor issues “to the extent necessary” to 
provide investors with an accurate view of the company’s financial position and the 
risks to that position.30
In addition to the new EU non-financial disclosure requirements, the Nordic 
countries have been leaders in requiring corporate reporting that is more 
comprehensive than the reporting required by the EU’s 2003 Accounts 
Modernization Directive. Since 2008, public companies in Sweden must make a 
sustainability report consistent with GRI.31 Since January 2009, approximately 1,100 
24.  See id. at 14. 
25.  See id. at 14-15. 
26.  See id. at 15. 
27.  See Beate Sjåfjell & Linn Anker Sørensen, Directors’ Duties and Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR), 25-27, in BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIES: RESHAPING AND 
HARMONISING THEIR ORGANISATION AND DUTIES (Hanne Birkmose, Mette Neville & Karsten 
Engsig Sørensen eds. Kluwer Law Int’l 2013/2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2322680. 
28.  See Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 
2014, amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information 
by certain large undertakings and groups, 2014 O.J. (L330) 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content 
/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32014L0095. 
29.  See id. at ¶ 6. 
30.  See Sjåfjell & Sørensen, supra note 27, at 25, 35. For further discussion of the 2003 Accounts 
Modernization Directive, see Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Triumph or Tragedy? The Curious Path 
of Corporate Disclosure Reform in the UK, 31:2 WM & MARY ENV. L.J. 317 (2007). 
31.  See JAN BERTIL ANDERSON & FRIDA SEGENMARK, SUSTAINABLE COMPANIES: BARRIERS 
AND POSSIBILITIES IN SWEDISH COMPANY LAW (University of Oslo Res. Paper No. 2013-09 2013), 
at 13, http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2248584.
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large companies in Denmark, as well as institutional investors and loan providers, 
have been required to publish an annual corporate responsibility report, following 
a 2008 government Action Plan on Corporate Responsibility.32 Companies may use 
their annual reporting to the U.N. Global Compact as the framework for their 
public disclosure, and institutional investors may report on their incorporation of 
the Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI) developed by the U.N. 
Environment Programme.33 And as of 1 July 2013, Norwegian companies must 
report on labor issues, gender equality, anti-discrimination and environmental 
issues, including reporting on what they are doing to incorporate these issues and 
human rights concerns into management practices.34
These examples are indicative of a global trend towards required corporate 
responsibility reporting. According to a 2015 report by the Initiative for Responsible 
Investment of the Hauser Institute for Civil Society at the Kennedy School, Harvard 
University, twenty-two countries and the European Union have enacted legislation 
within the last fifteen years to require public companies to issue reports including 
environmental and/or social information.35 These countries include Argentina, 
China, Denmark, the EU, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany Greece, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Ireland (specific to state-supported financial institutions after the 
2008 financial crisis), Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the U.K.36 Of these countries, France is particularly 
noteworthy, having been a leader by requiring publicly-listed companies to report 
data on forty labor and social criteria since 2002, followed by requirements in 2009 
for companies with more than five-hundred employees in high-emitting sectors to 
publish their greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions.37
In addition to these reporting initiatives, seven stock exchanges require social 
and/or environmental disclosure as part of their listing requirements: Australia’s 
ASX, Brazil’s Bovespa, India’s Securities and Exchange Board, the Bursa Malaysia, 
Oslo’s Børs, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and the London Stock Exchange.38
Moreover, seven countries have enacted policies following those of the U.K. and 
Sweden, which since 2000 have required pension funds to disclose the extent to 
which the fund incorporates social and environmental information into their 
32.  See Karin Buhmann, Company Law as an Agent for Migration of CR-Related International Law into 
Company Self-Regulation? The Case of the CR Reporting Requirement, 8:2-3 EUR. COMPANY L. 65, 68 (2011). 
33.  See id. For more information on the PRI, see About the PRI, http://www.unpri.org/about. 
34.  See Sjåfjell & Sørensen, supra note 27, at 26-27. 
35.  See Initiative for Responsible Investment, Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Efforts by 
National Governments and Stock Exchanges (March 12, 2015), http://hausercenter.org/iri/wp-content 
/uploads/2015/04/CSR-3-27-15.pdf. 
36.  See id. 
37.  See id., citing the New Economic Regulations Act in France, 2002. 
38.  See id. 
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investment decisions.39 These countries include Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, and Japan.40
II. THE GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE
A. Description
One particularly significant voluntary disclosure initiative is GRI. As stated 
above, GRI’s voluntary framework for ESG reporting has emerged as the global 
benchmark: eighty-two percent of the Global 250 companies use GRI as the basis 
for their corporate responsibility reporting.41 And as of 2015, ninety-three percent 
of the global 250 companies publish a stand-alone social report,42 so this is no longer 
a fringe activity. 
GRI is now in its fourth iteration, called G4, having begun in 1997 as a project 
of two Boston-based NGOs that promote environmental transparency, and 
supported from the beginning by the United Nations Environment Programme.43
The two founding NGOs were CERES, the Coalition of Environmentally 
Responsible Economies, then led by Rev. Robert Massie, and the Tellus Institute, 
of which GRI developed from a project initiated by Dr. Allen White.44 GRI soon 
moved its headquarters to Amsterdam, and expanded its scope beyond 
environmental reporting to social reporting as well. It has been developed by, and 
is used by, thousands of companies, governments, and non-profit entities around 
the world to report on the economic, environmental, social, and governance aspects 
of their organization and actions.45
The goal of GRI is to provide a standard, high-quality framework for 
organizations to use and adapt for purposes of their “triple bottom line” reporting, 
which is reporting on their most “critical impacts—positive or negative—on the 
environment, society and the economy.”46 The framework includes two parts: 
“general standard disclosures” for all organizations, and “specific standard 
disclosures” based on the industry and social and environmental risks and 
39.  For a discussion of this requirement in the U.K., and other early social and environmental 
disclosure requirements, see Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way?: The Erosion 
of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493 (2005) (arguing that 
differences in the “shareholder wealth maximizing” norm between the U.K. and U.S. were substantial 
enough to cast doubt on the idea of an “Anglo-American corporate governance” system). 
40.  See Initiative for Responsible Investment, supra note 35. 
41.  See KPMG, supra note 20, at 11.
42.  See id. at 10. 
43.  See “Our History” in GRI, GRI: EMPOWERING SUSTAINABLE DECISIONS, OUR FIVE-
YEAR FOCUS 2015-2020, https://www.globalreporting.org/information/news-and-press-center 
/Documents/GRI-Five-year-focus-2015.pdf. 
44.  See David Levy, Halina S. Brown, & Martin de Jong, The Contested Politics of Corporate 
Governance: The Case of the Global Reporting Initiative, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 88, (2010) (discussing role of Massie 
and White in creating GRI). 
45.  See Global Reporting Initiative, http://www.globalreporting.org.
46.  Id. 
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opportunities in that particular industry. The general standard disclosures comprise 
seven categories, those being “strategy and analysis; organizational profile; identified 
material aspects and boundaries; stakeholder engagement; report profile; 
governance; and ethics and integrity.”47 The specific standard disclosures include 
Disclosure on Management’s Approach (DMA) to identifying and managing its 
material Aspects; and then ninety-one potential indicators describing various social, 
economic and environmental material Aspects that might be affected by a 
company’s operations. Sector specific frameworks are being developed to identify 
specific standard disclosures for airport operators; construction and real estate; 
electric utilities; event organizers; financial services; food processing; media; mining 
and metals; NGOs and oil and gas. New to G4, organizations are asked to identify 
the boundaries they are using in defining the scope of reporting, recognizing that 
the boundaries of an organization’s effects can be both within its organization and 
outside of its organization, such as in its supply chain or in the communities where 
it operates. 
B. Analysis 
In 2015, GRI articulated five premises that inform its work and strategy for 
the subsequent five years. Those are: 
“We believe: 
• In the power of a multi-stakeholder process and inclusive network 
• Transparency is a catalyst for change 
• Our standards empower informed decision making 
• A global perspective is needed to change the world 
• Public interest should drive every decision an organization makes”48
That producing GRI reports has not necessarily led to more systematic 
consideration of sustainability issues in corporations’ decision-making is implicit in 
GRI’s observation as part of its five-year plan that it is now time to move beyond 
reporting. As it states: 
Our focus has always been on the reporting process and the value of the 
information that comes from it. While the sustainability report remains a 
crucial output of the reporting process, we must now move beyond the 
report itself to ensure that decision makers have access to the high quality 
and reliable information they are increasingly demanding . . . . 
But for this information to truly empower sustainable decisions in every 
organization, it must be more accessible, comparable and available in real-
time.49
47.  See GRI, G4 FAQS, https://www.globalreporting.org/information/FAQs/G4FAQ 
/Pages/default.aspx.
48.  See GRI, GRI: EMPOWERING SUSTAINABLE DECISIONS; OUR FIVE-YEAR FOCUS 2015-
2020, https://www.globalreporting.org/information/news-and-press-center/Documents/GRI-Five 
-year-focus-2015.pdf.
49.  Id.
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While comparability of information has been an articulated goal for GRI’s 
triple bottom line disclosure, just as it is for financial disclosure, in fact GRI’s 
framework allows for quite non-comparable reports among organizations. This is 
because organizations can choose to report in accordance with GRI’s G4 
framework based on one of two options, just as they’ve been able to choose their 
approach to reporting in prior versions of GRI. “Core” reporting requires a generic 
DMA (Disclosure of Management’s Approach) and use of at least one indicator for 
each material Aspect of an organization’s operations; while “comprehensive” 
reporting requires a generic DMA and use of all indicators that GRI has identified 
for each material aspect. While organizations are encouraged to report on indicators 
that give a comprehensive and balanced view of material aspects, there is no 
enforcement mechanism to advance that normative suggestion. As a result, even 
where companies are in the same sector, their reports cannot easily be compared. 
One study comparing GRI reports in the automotive industry sought to 
evaluate whether the information being produced by GRI reporters can be used in 
the way GRI suggests—to affect organizations’ decisions, to promote sustainability 
and to empower outside stakeholders—and concluded as follows: 
In sum, our brief analysis of actual GRI reports suggests that even though 
all [automotive] companies claim full coverage of the GHG indicators, the 
information they provide is of limited practical use. A look at other 
indicators confirms this finding. Thus, quantitative data are not always 
gathered systematically and reported completely, while qualitative 
information appears unbalanced and often fails to include a credible 
assessment of the sustainability impacts of various measures taken by a 
reporting organization. These findings are consistent with a GRI study on 
human rights reporting, according to which only [seven] percent of all 
reports examined complied with the information requirements of 
quantitative human rights indicators.50
Other academic studies have observed similar problems with the 
comparability of the information being reported.51
As also stated in its 2015 five-year strategic plan, an additional premise 
underlying GRI’s sustainability reporting is that it “ensures organizations consider 
their impacts on these sustainability issues . . . .”52 This claim has also been subjected 
to academic analysis, and was found wanting. Thus, Markus Milne, Amanda Ball, 
and Rob Gray, a pioneer in social accounting, surveyed the existing literature on 
50.  Klaus Dingwerth & Margot Eichinger, Tamed Transparency: How Information Disclosure under 
the Global Reporting Initiative Fails to Empower, 10:3 GLOBAL ENV. POL. 74, 88 (2010), citing GLOBAL 
REPORTING INITIATIVE AND ROBERTS ENVIRONMENT CENTER, REPORTING ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
A SURVEY CONDUCTED BY THE GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE AND THE ROBERTS 
ENVIRONMENT CENTER, (Claremont McKenna College 2008). 
51.  See, e.g., Levy, Brown, & de Jong, supra note 44; Carl-Johan Hedberg & Fredrik von 
Malmborg, The Global Reporting Initiative and Corporate Sustainability Reporting in Swedish Companies, 10 CORP.
SOC. RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT. 153, 163 (2003). 
52.  See GRI, supra note 48.
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GRI as a preeminent example of triple bottom line reporting, and evaluated the 
potential of GRI reports to promote actual sustainability. Their evaluation found 
serious gaps.53 As summarized in their research from 2012-13: 
The quality—and, especially, the completeness—of many TBL [triple bottom 
line] reports are not high. Despite increased awareness, recent reporting 
remains little better than that of the early European pioneers in the early 
1990s. And with a few notable exceptions, the reports cover few 
stakeholders, cherry pick elements of news and generally ignore the major 
social issues that arise from corporate activity such as lobbying, advertising, 
increased consumption, distributions of wealth and so on. The reports 
often refer to “sustainability” and “sustainable development,” but virtually 
unaddressed are issues of equity and social justice, and completely 
unaddressed are issues of the scale of development, limits and constraints 
to that development, and future generations: issues we identified in the 
previous section [of this Article] as core to sustainability concerns.54
Milne, Ball and Gray concluded that “current efforts of environmental or 
sustainability reporting are woefully inadequate means on which to form ideas about 
‘success’ in terms of the ecological logic needed to reorganise and ‘control’ 
economic activity.”55 In fact, their conclusion is that triple bottom line reporting 
may actually impede sustainability, because companies and possibly NGOs are 
putting so much emphasis on reporting, which may amount “to little more than 
soothing palliatives that, in fact, may be moving us towards greater levels of 
unsustainability” by permitting business as usual.56
These negative assessments may suggest that GRI has not achieved very much, 
a suggestion that is inaccurate. GRI at least has the ambition of promoting 
systematic, useful sustainability reporting by emphasizing the disclosure of objective 
facts about environmental, economic and social performance,57 rather than 
encouraging soft statements about commitments and management approaches. As 
a normative commitment, that is important, presumably having an influence on 
other disclosure initiatives. As set out above, GRI standards are being reflected in 
some domestic laws and stock exchange listing requirements, which suggests that 
GRI’s technical expertise in developing useful ESG metrics is being recognized. 
Moreover, its adoption by thousands of companies, including eighty-two percent of 
the global 250 companies, shows that it is the benchmark voluntary standard for 
ESG disclosure. Such diffusion at least suggests a realistic potential for continuous 
improvement to advance GRI’s own strategic goals of greater comparability 
53.  Markus J. Milne, Amanda Ball & Rob Gray, Wither Ecology? The Triple Bottom Line, the Global 
Reporting Initiative, and the Institutionalization of Corporate Sustainability Reporting, 188(1) J. BUS. ETHICS 1
(2013). 
54.  Id. at 9 (citation omitted). 
55.  Id. at 16. 
56.  Id. at 17. 
57.  See Peter M. Clarkson, Yue Li, Gordon D. Richardson & Florin P. Vasvari, Revisiting the 
Relation Between Environmental Performance and Environmental Disclosure: An Empirical Analysis, 33 ACCT.,
ORGS. & SOC’Y 303, 309 (2008).
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between different companies’ sustainability analyses and greater depth of coverage 
within companies. Yet, in order for GRI disclosure to ultimately to have a positive 
effect on company action it must be true that companies manage what they measure, 
not only for financial data but for ESG data as well. We now turn to that question. 
III. DISCLOSURE STRATEGIES GENERALLY
With respect to ESG disclosure, significant questions remain about the 
accuracy of the oft-repeated maxim that “you manage what you measure.” With 
financial disclosure, such as results of operations, or earnings per share, tens of 
thousands of securities analysts and tens of thousands of security firms’ computers 
stand ready to absorb the information when it is disclosed, use it in calculations and 
algorithms, and make decisions about buying, selling, holding, hedging, limiting, 
splitting, aggregating and generally transacting in securities and derivatives on the 
basis of the information. Thus, as we know, companies do manage what they 
measure, sometimes even making decisions to sacrifice longer-term, net positive 
present value transactions in order to show current quarter financial results in line 
with analysts’ expectations,58 referred to as “earnings management.” US academic 
research has found that pressure on corporate managers to deliver short-term 
investment results has become so strong that nearly eighty percent of chief financial 
officers report they would sacrifice future economic value to manage short-term 
earnings so as to meet investor expectations.59
Moreover, much of this financial disclosure in the U.S. is required by Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations. Companies cannot leave out bad 
news, as they can with voluntary ESG disclosure, and so attention gets paid to 
managing bad financial news. Even where not legally required, such as some 
forward-looking statements and financial projections, pressures by market 
participants for financial projections and other future-looking information make 
issuing such statements a strongly-observed norm by close to all companies 
reporting in the U.S. and trading on its exchanges.
But what evidence is there that ESG disclosure has a similar external effect, 
sending thousands of analysts and computers into action, and thus a similarly 
powerful internal effect on managers’ time and attention? In short, what evidence 
is there of the core corporate accountability premise that collecting, analyzing, and 
disclosing greater ESG information will cause managers to pay more attention to 
these matters, that they will “manage what they measure?” 
58.  For a concise discussion of concerns about this phenomenon, see CLAIRE A. HILL & BRETT 
H. MCDONNELL, SHORT AND LONG TERM INVESTORS (AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS TOO): MUST 
(AND DO) THEIR INTERESTS CONFLICT?, (U. Mn. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 15-37 2015), http://www
.ssrn.com/abstract=2699324. 
59.  John Graham, Campbell Harvey & Shivaram Rajgopal, Value Destruction and Financial 
Reporting Decisions, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS’ J. 27, 27-29 (2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=871215 (finding 
that some of the actions that these managers say they would take to meet analysts’ expectations include 
delaying long-term investments, reducing research and development expenditures, or eliminating 
planned marketing campaigns).
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The answer, so far as this author can determine, is that there are very few 
empirical studies of the accuracy of that premise. Empirical papers showing 
important external, financial effects of corporate sustainability initiatives (such as 
lower costs of capital, higher valuations, and lower stock-price volatility) are 
abundant, and many of those studies evaluate companies’ commitments to 
sustainability through their disclosure.60 Thus, empirical papers about investors’ 
reactions to expanded ESG disclosure are readily available.61 Given that financial 
markets do react to companies’ ESG disclosure, there is reason to believe that some 
companies might well manage what they measure in this realm, and might 
particularly start to do so in regions such as the EU where mandatory ESG 
disclosure requirements are coming on-line.62
Regarding the internal effects of voluntary ESG disclosure, though, this author 
could find few empirical papers. Academic pioneers publish case studies about the 
potential for positive internal effects of expanded disclosure,63 as do accounting 
firms that have a business interest in promoting expanded disclosure, such as 
KPMG.64 There is some evidence that firms with better environmental performance 
disclose more environmental information, but that does not indicate that the 
disclosure itself causes the better environmental performance.65 If anything, the 
authors’ analysis seems to indicate that causation goes the other way, that is, better 
environmental performers decide to disclose more, including emphasizing objective 
60.  An excellent overview of this literature is found in GORDON L. CLARK, ANDREAS FEINER 
& MICHAEL VIEHS, FROM THE STOCKHOLDER TO THE STAKEHOLDER: HOW SUSTAINABILITY CAN
DRIVE FINANCIAL OUTPERFORMANCE (2015) (overview of empirical studies investigating the 
relationships between corporate sustainability initiatives and better financial performance, lower stock 
market volatility, higher valuations, lower costs of capital, and so forth). 
61.  See id.
62.  See Jody Grewal, Edward J. Riedl & George Serafeim, Market Reactions to Mandatory 
Nonfinancial Disclosure (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2657712. That paper reviews 
prior findings about the external effects of disclosure, and also identifies three studies of the operational 
(internal) effects of mandatory disclosure, which papers are discussed below. The paper’s main 
contribution is to evaluate the equity market reaction to the EU’s new (as of 2014) mandatory ESG 
disclosure requirements, and finds, in general, a statistically significant negative reaction, which is more 
pronounced with respect to companies that did not engage in ESG disclosure prior to the requirement 
coming into effect. The authors interpret the generally negative market reaction to be an expression of 
investors’ views that the cost of complying with the new disclosure obligations outweigh the benefit of 
the new information that will be brought to the market. 
63.  Two such expanded disclosure pioneers are Bob Eccles, until recently a professor at 
Harvard Business School, and Allen White, co-founder of the GRI. See ROBERT G. ECCLES &
MICHAEL P. KRZUS, INTEGRATED REPORTING FOR A SUSTAINABLE STRATEGY (John Wiley & Sons 
2010); Allen L. White, New Wine, New Bottles: The Rise of Non-Financial Reporting, A Business Brief by Business 
for Social Responsibility, June 20, 2005, http://www.businesswire.com/portal/binary/com.epicentric 
.contentmanagement.servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/services/ir_and_pr/ir_resource_center/editorial
s/2005/BSR.pdf. 
64.  See, e.g., https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2013/04/integrated-reporting 
.html (discussing Integrated Reporting initiative) (last visited Jan. 21, 2016). 
65.  See Clarkson, Li, Richardson & Vasvari, supra note 57, 319-20 (using voluntary 
environmental disclosure and evaluating environmental performance using Toxic Release Inventory 
data, finding a statistically significant positive relationship between superior environmental performance 
and more environmental disclosure of facts about a company’s record). 
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facts about their performance (such as percentages of toxic releases per dollar of 
profit).66
This author could find little empirical testing of the underlying accountability 
premise that collecting, collating and disclosing ESG information itself causes 
important changes within companies, such that those companies start to improve 
their ESG performance. One recent article discussing the internal, transformative 
effects thought to be associated with greater information collection and disclosure 
was Eccles and Serafeim’s Corporate and Integrated Reporting: A Functional Perspective,
which discusses both the external “information function” of ESG disclosure, and 
the internal “transformative function.”67 That article discusses the relatively new 
(since 2002) integrated reporting concept, <IR>, which incorporates financial and 
ESG reporting into one report using a framework evaluating the six types of capital 
every company uses to create value, those being financial, manufactured, natural, 
intellectual, human, and social and relationship capital. While the article discusses 
the transformative potential within the firm from the cross-functional 
collaborations and “joined-up thinking” necessary to produce an integrated report, 
the authors concluded (in 2014) that: 
While it is clearly too soon to claim that many companies and investors are 
reaping the information and transformation benefits of integrated 
reporting, that is clearly the intent of companies that are its early 
practitioners, people who have written on the subject, and the new <IR> 
framework.68
Eccles and Serafeim then use a case study approach to compare two 
companies’ integrated reports, focusing on the external, informational function of 
the reports.69 Ultimately the article concludes that without a mandatory regulatory 
framework monitoring and enforcing regulatory standards to ensure accuracy, 
comparability and reliability, integrated reporting, like sustainability reporting 
generally, will be limited in its usefulness.70
It could be that this author’s inability to find quantitative empirical work 
evaluating the maxim “you manage what you measure” in the ESG context is simply 
a function of inadequate research skills, although the author’s informal efforts to 
research the topic have also failed.71 At the least, one can reasonably conclude that 
66.  See id.
67.  Robert G. Eccles & George Serafeim, Corporate and Integrated Reporting: A Functional 
Perspective, in CORPORATE STEWARDSHIP: ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE EFFECTIVENESS (Susan Albers 
Mohrman, James O’Toole &Edward E. Lawler III eds., Greenleaf Publishing 2015), http://www.ssrn 
.com/abstract=2388716. 
68.  Id. at 12. This author is among the “people who have written on the subject,” as is Bob 
Eccles himself. See Eccles & Krzus, supra note 63; Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, The Social 
Reform of Banking, 39(3) J. CORP. L. 459 (2014). 
69.  Id. at 15. 
70.  Id. at 18. 
71.  The author is a member of various listservs related to sustainability, sustainable financial 
markets, and socially responsible investment, and sent queries to those lists after being unable to find 
empirical studies. The author also sent queries to researchers known to be interested in the topic of 
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there is not a lot of quantitative empirical work testing the premise in the ESG 
context. As Delmas and Lessem have stated in 2014 regarding environmental 
disclosure policies, “[d]espite the popularity of environmental information policies, 
we still have little understanding of their effectiveness.”72 Certainly there is not a 
readily available body of evidence showing that companies are making significant 
improvements in their social and environmental performance because they have 
been engaging in voluntary ESG disclosure pursuant to GRI or any other 
framework.
IV. MANDATORY REGIMES AND THE POWER OF LEGALITY
A. Disclosure Regimes 
It may be that the problem with finding powerful indicators of internal 
transformation from ESG disclosure is thus that most of the regimes are still 
voluntary. Although disclosure frameworks like the GRI request that companies 
provide a balanced view of company results, companies can choose whether to 
engage in the ESG disclosure project, when to disclose, what to disclose, whether 
to discuss negative facts, trends, or data, what to emphasize, and what to ignore. A 
number of studies of specific, mandatory non-financial disclosure regimes have found 
operational effects. For instance, Bennear and Olmstead found that required 
disclosure to water customers in Massachusetts of companies’ water quality results 
and violations of safety standards produced between a thirty- and forty-four-percent 
reduction in violations by large companies, and a reduction in severe violations of 
between forty- and fifty-seven-percent.73 Similarly, Jin and Leslie found that when 
restaurants in Los Angeles County were required to post their health and hygiene 
inspection results in the window of the restaurant, subsequent health inspection 
scores increased by about five percent, the revenue of restaurants with an “A” grade 
was about five percent higher than those with a B, and the number of food-borne 
hospitalizations in the area decreased by twenty percent, which the authors 
interpreted as showing that restaurants were making quality improvements.74 The 
Toxic Release Inventory, which requires companies to disclose releases to air, 
ground and water of identified toxins, has been credited with substantial reductions 
ESG disclosure. There were no quantitative empirical studies of the “internal transformative effects” 
of expanded disclosure brought to the author’s attention through these methods, although there were 
many studies showing external effects brought to the author’s attention. 
72.  Magali A. Delmas & Neil Lessem, Saving power to conserve your reputation? The effectiveness of 
private versus public information, 67 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 353, 354 (2014) (providing individual 
feedback to college students on their energy use in their dorms had no effect on reducing energy use 
until the results of each room’s energy use were publicly posted, at which point high-energy users 
reduced their energy use by 20%). 
73.  See Lori S. Bennear & Sheila M. Olmstead, The Impacts of the “Right to Know”: Information 
Disclosure and the Violation of Drinking Water Standards, 56 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 117, 129 (2008). 
74.  See Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from 
Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118(2) Q.J. ECON. 409, 410 (2003). 
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in toxic emissions from industrial plants,75 although questions remain about the 
accuracy of those reported reductions.76 And a recent study of required mine safety 
disclosure enacted as part of Dodd-Frank showed a decrease in mining related 
citations of eleven percent and a decrease in mining injuries of thirteen percent as a 
result of the disclosure, an effect on company operations mediated through the 
stock market.77
Thus, what evidence there is of the power of non-financial disclosure is 
consistent with what we’ve seen in the financial disclosure arena: to have operational 
effects, disclosure must be mandatory (so that disclosers cannot be selective in what 
they disclose), specific, and targeted to clearly identified users. As with any 
regulatory regime, a disclosure regime needs to be well-designed (have intelligent 
metrics and proper scope), and be backed by well-resourced monitoring and 
enforcement in order to advance its underlying regulatory goals.78 Analysis by Fung, 
Graham and Weil of eight different mandatory transparency regimes concluded that 
to be highly effective in advancing the goals of the regime, the regime needs to 
become “doubly embedded,”79 by which they mean producing information that is 
valuable, comprehensible and useful to users of the information, which then cause 
shifts in user behavior, which then produces shifts in disclosers’ behavior.80
Applying that analysis suggests that expanded ESG disclosure has some distance to 
go to become broadly effective in altering corporate behavior: it must become 
mandatory, and then specific users such as investors or regulators must alter their 
behavior in ways that companies perceive as tied to the information being disclosed 
so that market or policy signals are amplified. This evaluation is also consistent with 
what Levy, Brown and de Jong concluded was one of the reasons that GRI has 
“stalled:” that “[t]here is widespread agreement that non-financial reports are rarely 
studied in any detail.”81
75.  See MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE: THE RISE OF TECHNOPOPULISM 17
(Brookings Institution Press 2002) (TRI “recognized as one of the nation’s most successful 
environmental regulation and was widely credited with encouraging target companies to cut toxic 
release by nearly 50 percent in ten years.”). 
76.  See ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS 
AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 86 (Cambridge University Press 2008) (noting concerns with 
inaccurate data, possibilities that some reductions were an artifact of differences in reporting 
procedures).
77.  See Hans B. Christensen, Eric Floyd, Lisa Yao Liu & Mark Maffett, The Real Effects of 
Mandatory Dissemination of Non-Financial Information Through Financial Reports, at 3, http://www.ssrn.com 
/abstract=2680296 (last visited Apr. 19, 2016).
78.  See GRAHAM, supra note 75, at 5. 
79.  FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 76, at 68. 
80.  See id. at 62-66. By that analysis, Fung et. al. concluded that corporate financial disclosure 
by publicly-traded companies, restaurant hygiene disclosure in Los Angeles, and the Community 
Reinvestment Act disclosure of mortgage rates according to race, gender and income are highly effective 
disclosure regimes, all having produced information that is useful to the relevant users, and those users 
of the information having changed their behavior, thus producing incentives for the reporters to change 
their behavior. Id. at 82-84. 
81.  Levy, Brown & de Jong, supra note 44, at 22. Other reasons the authors discuss for GRI’s 
current “stall,” based on qualitative research, is that the business case for expanded ESG disclosure, 
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B. Transnational Corporate Responsibility Regimes 
Broadening the focus of analysis from voluntary, transnational transparency 
regimes to voluntary transnational corporate social responsibility (CSR) regimes 
generally, of which ESG disclosure is a sub-set and key mechanism, we see a 
bewildering proliferation of voluntary initiatives that seek to set substantive 
standards and that are, in many instances, shaping norms of responsible corporate 
behavior. This CSR proliferation is one example of the regulatory terrain that has 
produced what Shaffer aptly calls “a jungle” of literature82 describing, theorizing 
and empirically examining these different transnational regulatory approaches.83 In 
the CSR terrain alone we observe, broadly speaking, public regulatory networks, 
public/private co-regulation, industry self-regulation, NGO collaborative 
regulation, and multi-lateral and multi-sectoral regulation.84 Organizations such as 
the Corporate Responsibility Association and the Corporate Social Responsibility 
Officers Association have been established to professionalize the role of corporate 
responsibility managers and to provide networks of such individuals across 
companies and industries,85 and businesses that produce conferences, websites and 
magazines to promote the corporate responsibility trend have proliferated.86
Over the last two decades, scholarship on these new forms of regulation has 
also proliferated, understandably, given the fascination of the new, under such 
names as “new governance,” “global administrative law,” “soft law,” “reflexive 
law,” “responsive regulation,” and so on.87 As Professor Orly Lobel discussed in an 
that it would lead to material financial benefits, which had been emphasized by GRI to produce 
corporate take-up, has not been substantiated in businesses’ experience (id. at 21-22); participation by 
labor, NGOs and financial analysts in GRI has either declined (labor and NGOs) or failed to materialize 
(financial analysts) (id. at 23-24); and socially-responsible investment firms, which might be expected to 
be the primary users of GRI reports, have developed their own, proprietary data-bases of information 
that is more specific and useful than that produced by GIR reports (id. at 24-26). Thus, the authors 
conclude, “[t]he stakeholders who have derived the most tangible economic benefits from non-financial 
reporting are the auditors, consultants and certifiers of corporate social performance reports.” Id. at 26. 
82.  Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering, ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 2
(forthcoming 2016). 
83.  Peer Zumbansen does a masterful job of summarizing and analyzing that literature. See Peer 
Zumbansen, Where the Wild Things Are: Transnational Legal Ordering, the Public/Private Distinction and the 
Western Legal Imagination (2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2723990, 
(particularly 13-14 for a summary of some of the different frameworks that have been used to try to 
understand the proliferation of hybrid public/private regimes). 
84.  For a description of some of the most prominent transnational regulatory initiatives in the 
corporate responsibility field, see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate 
Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. 
Gordon & Georg Ringe, eds.) (forthcoming 2016). 
85.  See Corporate Responsibility Association at www.corporateresponsibilityassociation.org 
and Corporate Responsibility Officers Association at www.croassociation.org. 
86.  For an early, qualitative research report on this trend see John M. Conley & Cynthia A. 
Williams, Engage, Embed and Embellish: The Theory and Practice of Corporate Social Responsibility, 31 J. CORP.
L. 1 (2005). 
87.  For an overview of the literature, including sources for these and other terms for new 
regulatory forms, see Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 262 (2004). 
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insightful early analysis, these regulatory forms have been based upon participation 
and partnership between public and private entities; collaboration among multi-
stakeholder groups; diversity and competition between regulatory regimes; better 
integration of related policy domains; and the potential for regulatory and quasi-
regulatory flexibility, adaptability and dynamic learning.88
And yet, scholarly fascination with these new, often voluntary, and certainly 
softer transnational regulatory forms may have allowed our collective attention to 
be diverted while old school, so-called “command and control”, domestic hard law89
has started to be systematically undermined by the expansion since the 1990s of 
large parts of the world covered by bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that include 
compulsory investor-state arbitration provisions.90 Of particular concern, investor-
state arbitration clauses are also included in current versions of treaties such as the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and Trans-Pacific Trade 
Treaties being negotiated in Spring of 2016 as this essay is being written. By virtue 
of these provisions, as they’ve been interpreted by private arbitrators, any investor, 
typically a multi-national enterprise, can challenge in private arbitration any 
legislation, regulation or even court decision that the investor can argue has 
undermined its future profits, without the possibility of public judicial review.91 As 
leading scholar Professor Gus van Harten has written, these BITs and other treaties 
such as NAFTA give private arbitrators the power to “decide upon the permissible 
scope of public powers to tax businesses, deliver public services, establish regulatory 
standards, control land use, and so on.”92 The potential for this litigation may also 
give governments pause when new regulations are being considered, as uncovered 
by Professors Van Harten and Scott in qualitative research on the regulatory 
processes in Ontario’s trade and environment ministries.93 That local regulators take 
the potential for investor/state arbitration into account when considering new 
88.  Id. 
89.  The term “command and control” as used to describe old governance forms of law often 
has a demeaning quality about it, in this author’s view, as the term is frequently used at least implicitly 
in a critical sense, and in contrast to the presumably more flexible, pragmatic forms of new governance. 
As argued by Joel Bakan, this argumentative contrast can make invisible both the ways in which 
corporations use “old governance” to advance their private interests, and can also conceptually 
undermine the importance of “command and control” approaches to advance the public interest and 
(sometimes) limit the harms private actors can cause. See Joel Bakan, The Invisible Hand of Law: Private 
Regulation and the Rule of Law, 48 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 279 (2015) (arguing that transnational private 
regulatory regimes cannot properly be understood as responding to a lack of domestic legal capacity in 
light of globalization, given the various ways in which corporations use domestic law to further their 
economic interests). 
90.  See VAN HARTEN, SOVEREIGN CHOICES, supra note 15 for a thorough discussion of this 
problem. For a short introduction showing the expansion of investor-state arbitrations since the 1990s, 
see Van Harten, Private Authority, supra note 15.
91.  See Van Harten, Private Authority, supra note 15, at 612-13.
92.  Id. at 608.
93.  See Gus Van Harten & Dayna Nadine Scott, Investment Treaties and the Internal Vetting of 
Regulatory Proposals: A Case Study from Canada, http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2700238 (describing 
results of interview-based study of how regulators within Ontario’s trade and environment ministries 
think about potential trade and ISDS litigation when considering new regulations).
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regulations suggests that investor/state dispute settlement procedures also 
constitute an emerging transnational legal order (“TLO”)—one that involves 
contestation at local and state levels, and one that is having effects on local, state 
and national laws and institutions. 
The scope of the investor/state arbitration system as an emerging TLO bears 
further elaboration. Its most problematic implication is that public, sovereign 
processes that seek to assert some social control over market forces, including by 
improving labor conditions, raising minimum wages, protecting consumers or 
addressing environmental problems, can be challenged by any company (“investor” 
in the treaties’ terms) in any country that has a BIT that generally consents to 
investor-state compulsory arbitration. Today there are over 2,800 BITs in place, the 
first having been signed by Turkey and Germany in 1959; but it is only since the late 
1990s that companies have started aggressively to use these treaty provisions to 
challenge state actions around the world.94 It is estimated that there are now four-
hundred active arbitrations on-going.95
Two examples of this litigation will illustrate some concerns with these 
challenges to state regulatory authority. Because of the problems in nuclear power 
plants in Fukushima, Japan, after the earthquake and tsunami in 2011, Germany 
closed its oldest nuclear plants immediately, as part of a comprehensive plan to 
phase out nuclear power between 2011 and 2020. This decision by the German 
government had the effect of closing even those plants it had in 2010 agreed to 
allow to have an “extended lifetime” beyond what had been the projected (and 
designed) end of operation for those plants. A Swedish energy company, Vattenfall, 
and its German subsidiary, sued Germany in 2012 for €3.7 billion using the investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS) procedure because two of Vattenfall’s oldest plants 
were shut down as a result of this decision—even though one of those plants 
(Krummel) had not been in operation since 2007, given safety concerns, and even 
though Vattenfall’s own financial statements in 2011 had estimated its losses as €1.1 
billion in reaction to the German government’s decision.96 Another recent example 
is TransCanada’s lawsuit against the U.S. for $15 billion in reaction to the Obama 
administration’s decision not to give a permit to the Keystone XL pipeline, which 
would have carried oil from the Canadian tar-sands to Nebraska, in order to connect 
to a pipeline to Louisiana for refining and shipment overseas.97
Whether Vatenfall’s or TransCanada’s particular action is right or wrong, or 
the damages claim inflated or not, is not a question this author has a particularly 
94.  See Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Rhea Tamara Hoffman, The German Nuclear Phase 
Out Put to the Test in International Investment Arbitration?, 2 (2013), https://www.tni.org/files 
/download/vattenfall-icsid-case_oct2013.pdf. See also Van Harten, Private Authority, supra note 15, at 
609-10 (data on increasing numbers of investor-state arbitrations since the late 1990s). 
95.  See Benasconi-Osterwalder & Hoffman, supra note 94.
96.  See id.
97.  See Rebecca Penty, TransCanada Fights Keystone Denial with $15 Billion Appeal, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESS, Jan. 6, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-06/transcanada-files 
-suit-over-keystone-xl-will-take-writedown.
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well-informed view upon. It is necessary for companies making long-term 
investments in infrastructure to have protections against rapid changes in the 
political environment that can rightly be called “expropriation” or “unfair or 
discriminatory treatment,” and those are the protections the BITs are meant to 
provide. Yet, it has been argued that the concepts of “expropriation” and “unfair 
or discriminatory treatment” have been interpreted far too broadly by many of the 
private arbitrators,98 and that the countervailing public interests in the challenged 
regulations interpreted too narrowly, undermining domestic regulatory capacity. 
Certainly TransCanada’s argument that the Keystone XL denial was based on 
“political” reasons and not the merits of the application99 supports the view that 
these investment treaties can undermine domestic, sovereign legal capacity. It 
should be unproblematic for countries to make decisions for political reasons such 
as to advance environmental values or to meet the country’s climate change 
commitments made in international agreements, both of which the Obama 
administration articulated as rationales for its rejection of the Keystone XL.100
The concern that the investor/state arbitration system undermines democratic 
values of rule of law, transparency and accountability has not only been discussed 
by academics and NGOs, but has been examined within global policy fora such as 
the U.N.’s Human Rights Council and the Council of Europe. In a 2015 report to 
the U.N. Human Rights Council, an Independent Expert given a mandate to study 
the matter, Professor Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, stated that “[m]any observers have 
expressed concern about certain investor–State dispute settlement arbitrations that 
have effectively overridden the State’s fulfilment of its function to regulate domestic 
labour, health and environmental policies, and have had adverse human rights 
impacts, also on third parties, including a ‘chilling effect’ with regard to the exercise 
of democratic governance.”101 Ultimately the Independent Expert concluded that 
these concerns are well-founded, indeed that the situation presents an 
“extraordinary problem,”102 and he proposed that the validity of BITs and free-
trade agreements should be tested under the rules of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties,103 and under states’ Constitutions,104 with an expectation that they 
would not be upheld. As he concluded about the latter point, it is unlikely under the 
Constitutions of most states that a state can “waive its ontological function to 
legislate in the public interest.”105 Professor de Zayas gave similar testimony in 2016 
to a Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the 
98.  See Van Harten, Private Authority, supra note 15, at 27. 
99.  Penty, supra note 97. 
100.  See id. 
101.  Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, Report of the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and 
equitable international order, Human Rights Council, A/HRC/30/44 (14 July 2015), ¶ 5, http://ohchr.org 
/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session30/Pages/ListReports.aspx. 
102.  Id. ¶ 41. 
103.  Id. ¶ 42 
104.  Id. ¶ 44. 
105.  Id. 
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Council of Europe, which is examining investor/state dispute settlement 
procedures for a report to be issued in 2017.106
What is worth emphasizing at a general level is that Shaffer and Halliday’s 
framework of transnational legal orders brings attention to a key issue: how do 
particular transnational frameworks “touch down” in legal processes, contracts, or 
proceedings, which by definition will involve local specification and an attention to 
hard law and legal power; and what are the conflicts and contestations that the 
transnational regime engenders in the process? As they state the point, “key to the 
TLO framework is ‘the production of order, or, in our terms, the normative settlement 
of law,” a process that involves “the institutionalization of a TLO, which occurs multi-
directionally and recursively up from and down to the national and local levels.”107
It is thus both a theoretical and analytic framework, but also a call for empirical 
evidence that can be brought to bear to understand, among many other questions, 
the interaction of specific transnational regulatory regimes and domestic (or even 
municipal) law in specific instances. 
In the corporate responsibility context, private, voluntary, soft law regimes are 
proliferating, in many heterogeneous forms. A recent report commissioned by one 
of the EU’s largest conservation organizations, the Royal Society for the Protection 
of Birds, suggests that most (eighty-two percent) of the 161 voluntary regimes it 
surveyed are not effective, though, either not being ambitious enough, not achieving 
their ambitions, even if ambitious, or not having enough industry take-up to make 
a serious difference.108 This finding is provocative, but invites systematic evaluation 
of how individual trans-regulatory initiatives fare, and under what conditions might 
we expect such CSR regimes to be effective.109 Shaffer and Halliday’s work suggests 
individual regimes need to be the focus of analysis, and in specific, focuses analysis 
on how such regimes “touch down.” Which CSR regimes, if any, are powerfully 
effective in shaping company behavior? Which, if any, are ambitious enough to meet 
the policy challenges that gave rise to the regime, that achieve their ambition, and 
that have substantial industry take-up? And if such individual initiatives do exist, 
this author would add that it is important to evaluate whether there are collisions 
106.  See Press Release, U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement Undermines Rule of Law and Democracy, U.N. Expert Tells Council of Europe, (Apr. 19, 2016), 
http://ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19839&LangID=E. 
107.  TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 13, at 5. 
108.  See D. McCarthy & P. Morling, Using Regulation as a Last Resort? Assessing the Performance of 
Voluntary Approaches, ROYAL SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF BIRDS (2015), https://www.rspb.org 
.uk/Images/usingregulation_tcm9-408677.pdf. 
109.  There is some excellent empirical work on individual regimes, but there needs to be much 
more, including evaluations of effectiveness. See, e.g., Colin Scott, Fabrizio Cafaggi & Linda Senden, 
eds., The Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation: Conceptual and Constitutional Debates, 38(1) J.L. & SOC’Y
1 (2011) (introducing empirical studies of regimes in food, security, and finance, and including 
evaluations of legitimacy, enforcement, and efficacy); Erroll Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global 
Private-Public Regulation: the Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47 (2006) (discussing Forest Stewardship 
Council in forestry); Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational 
Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 113 AM. J. SOC. 297 (2007) (discussing supply 
chains and private regulation). 
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between the apparent progress being achieved by the regime, and challenges in the 
same field to domestic regulation enabled by investor-state dispute settlement 
processes, which is itself a rapidly-developing TLO providing legal protections for 
investors.
The context of looking at “collisions” needs both a global and local focus, 
since investor-state dispute procedures are not the only way in which some 
companies are undermining domestic law. Professor John Coates has collected data 
showing that half of First Amendment cases in the United States today are used to 
defend corporate interests and deflect regulation, particularly required disclosure, 
which trend in the case law, he concludes, shows that “in aggregate, [these cases] 
degrade the rule of law, rendering it less predictable, general and clear. This 
corruption risks significant economic harms in addition to [risking] the loss of a 
republican form of government.”110 Nor is the “collision” between transnational 
private regulation and investor-state dispute settlement procedures the only way 
private regulation has been incompletely understood. As Professor Joel Bakan 
argues, transnational private regulatory regimes cannot fully be understood as 
responding to a lack of domestic legal capacity in light of globalization, as they are 
often conceptualized, given the various ways in which corporations use domestic 
law to further their economic interests.111 In other words, Professor Bakan argues, 
it is not a lack of domestic legal capacity that gives rise to lacunae that private 
transnational regimes address, but rather decisions by domestic legislators not to 
use their legislative powers in robust fashion to address human rights, consumer 
protection, environmental concerns, or labor rights in an extraterritorial context that 
give rise to a need for private transnational regimes. 
V. CONCLUSION
As set out in the Introduction, my view is that the academic attention that has 
been paid to transnational, private, social and environmental CSR regimes 
(including in my own work) has been understandable and possibly even necessary: 
after all, this is one of the important regulatory developments that we see intensified 
by the processes of financialization and continuing globalization. Yet our attention 
to these developments has likely deflected adequate attention from the powerful 
ways transnational corporations are undermining and challenging domestic laws 
that seek to advance social and environmental goals similar to those of many of the 
transnational regimes we study and even celebrate. 
What Shaffer and Halliday have done is provide a clear, empirically informed 
framework for evaluating and understanding these collisions of regimes. Which 
110.  John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data and Implications,
30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 223 (2015). 
111.  See Joel Bakan, The Invisible Hand of Law: Private Regulation and the Rule of Law, 48 Cornell 
Int’l L.J. 279 (2015). See also Ronen Shamir, Socially Responsible Private Regulation: World-Culture or World-
Capitalism?, 45 L. & SOC. REV. 313 (2011) (challenging the view that CSR is a response to a lack of legal 
capacity, but rather arguing that it is a business-created mechanism to deflect regulation). 
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norms, really, have settled where, in which legal processes, and why? Looking at the 
investor-state dispute settlement processes, being heard by private arbitrators, often 
in the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), with little to no public transparency, accountability or public participation, 
versus the world of CSR, suggests that in many cases the settled norms are not those 
of transnational corporate responsibility and expanded ESG disclosure. But it is not 
at a general level that the next investigations should occur; rather, it is regime by 
regime, country by country, litigation by litigation. Shaffer and Halliday and their 
contributing authors have shown how this can be done in their excellent book 
Transnational Legal Orders, challenging those of us interested in CSR and regulatory 
theory to do the same. 
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